Concurrent Session 2b: Contextualizing Moral Obligations

Chair: xxx(University)

Moral Responsibility: the Paradox of Promising Knowledge and Committing Awareness

Ronald Commers
Department of Philosophy
Center for Ethics and Value inquiry
Ghent University
Ghent, Belgium

I shall spell out the moral responsibility theme from the point of view of Vladimir Jankélévitch (the French moral philosopher) on the asymmetry of rights and duties (final chapter of his Le paradoxe de la morale, 1981). In expounding this asymmetry, I shall elucidate the paradox of, at one side, a moral knowledge that holds a promise to do, and at the other side, an awareness of what ought to be done, which is committing.

Seven themes will be clarified. First: the ethical significance of the asymmetry of right and obligation. Second: the meaning of risk taking (on the opposite of ‘luck’). Third: making sense of engagement or commitment. Fourth: the importance (ce qui importe) of comprehension based on acquaintance with persons, relationships, time, and social objects (such as wealth and poverty, health, and education). Fifth: the weight of kairos, the accurate moment to act and to do (faire séance tenante). Sixth: the burden of not being able to delegate or to rely on some ‘vicariate’ (authority, either religious or political, or administrative). Seventh: the implication of moral creativity, in going beyond custom, established rule, legal norm, or past engagement.

In shedding light on these seven issues, linked with the paradox of knowledge and awareness of the obligation to do, I shall refer to some examples taken from world literature (L. Tolstoj, V. Grossman, J. Roth).

What Do We Owe Each Other In A Sexual Relationship? First Meditations

Paul Reynolds
Department of Social and Psychological Sciences
Edge Hill University
Ormskirk, UK

The question of what we owe each other, principally expressed as duties or responsibilities or obligations, has been an enduring question in moral philosophy.  In this paper I want to specifically and narrowly approach this question in respect of the sphere of sexual lives, and particularly the sexual relations we have with specific others – whether  partners, fuck-buddies, casual encounters, group fellow participants, or any other variant where physical sexual relationships are engaged with, whether directly, on the phone or online. If we have a sexual relationship with someone, what responsibilities, obligations or duties do I have to them? This paper will map and explore some starting categories – such as health and hygiene, cultural and social etiquette, permissions and prohibitions in contact, reciprocity of relation – and then explore the problems with ascribing responsibilities that either arise from other relational contexts or make assumptions about the nature of sexual relationships – such as those involving love, or marriage, or monogamy. It will then move on to address issues of desire and pleasure, sexual diversity and difference and sexual practice and erotica, and argue that sexual responsibilities and obligations are complex, open ended and elusive outside quite traditional notions of non-malfeasance such as those raised by disease, contraception and absence of deceit. In this first mediation, the intention is to clear the ground and advance some first thoughts on how sexual obligations, responsibilities and/or duties might be described free of moralizing constraint, address the specificity of the sexual and in relation to sexual desire and pleasure.

Assuming Full Responsibility:  On Self-Development and Collective Responsibility in the Thought of Max Scheler and Karol Wojtyla

Alicja Gescinska
Department of Philosophy
Center for Ethics and Value inquiry
Ghent University
Ghent, Belgium

It has repeatedly been claimed that every person is responsible for the wellbeing of every other person. This view is of course famously associated with Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov and has inspired many 20th century philosophers. Jean-Paul Sartre adopted and elaborated this view in L’existentialisme est un humanisme, Nikolaj Berdjaev expressed a similar view in The New Middle Ages and both Max Scheler and Karol Wojtyla put this principle in the heart of their ethics. Notwithstanding the fact that this claim may seem to be lacking quite some nuances, it remains interesting to examine how these philosophers and writers tried to undergird this statement. This paper will examine the way Scheler and Wojtyla tried to do this, by a) their concept of the human person, b) their views on self-development, and c) the notion of the Other in their writings. It will be argued that these philosopher’s views can offer a valuable supplement to contemporary philosophical debates on moral motivation (internalism vs. externalism) and the role of emotions in our moral motivation and behaviour.